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NOTE
MITIGATING MEASURES UNDER THE AMERICANS
WITH DISABILITIES ACT: INTERPRETATION
AND DEFERENCE IN THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS
In its recent landmark case interpreting the Americans with Disa-
bilities Act (ADA),' Bragdon v. Abbott,2 the Supreme Court acknowl-
edged but declined to address a dispute which has split the circuit
courts.3 The dispute centers around the definition of disability under
the ADA and, more precisely, whether the use and availability of miti-
gating measures (such as medications or prosthetic devices) should be
considered in determining whether an impairment is substantially
limiting.4 Although the split was brought to its attention,5 the Court
found addressing this issue unnecessary to resolving the case.
In order to qualify for protection under the ADA, a plaintiff must
have an "impairment" which "substantially limits one or more of the
[plaintiff's] major life activities."6 An Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) interpretation of this requirement states, "The
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (1994).
2 118 S. Ct. 2196 (1998).
3 See id. at 2206.
4 For further discussion, see Erica Worth Harris, Controlled Impairments Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Search for the Meaning of "Disability" 73 WASH. L. REv.
575 (1998); Arthur F. Silbergeld & Stacie S. Polashuk, Chronic Serious Health Impair-
ments and Worker Absences Under Federal Employment Laws, 14 LAB. LAw. 1 (1998);
Carolyn V. Counce, Note, Corrective Devices and Nearsightedness Under the ADA, 228 U.
MEM. L. REv. 1195 (1998); MichaelJ. Puma, Note, Respecting the Plain Language of the
ADA: A Textualist Argument Rejecting the EEOC's Analysis of Controlled Disabilities, 67 GEo.
WASH. L. Rav. 123 (1998); Recent Cases, 111 HAuv. L. Ruv. 2456 (1998) (discussing the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997);
see also Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., The Americans with Disabilities Act: Analysis and Implica-
tions of a Second-Generation Civil Rights Statute, 26 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 413 (1991).
5 See Amicus Brief for the United States at 18, n.10, Bragdon (No. 97-156).
6 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A).
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determination of whether an individual is substantially limited in a
major life activity must be made on a case by case basis, without regard
to mitigating measures such as medicines, or assistive or prosthetic
devices."' 7 In cases where a plaintiffs impairment is controlled by a
mitigating measure, the ADA may apply even if the plaintiff does not
experience any substantially limiting effects.8 Facing the issue in cases
involving vision impairment,9 diabetes,10 epilepsy, stress-induced de-
pression,12 Graves' disease,13 and Adult Stills disease,14 the circuit
courts have split-some deferring to the EEOC interpretation, some
finding the EEOC interpretation contrary to the statute.
The judicial process by which a court addresses the issue of miti-
gating measures appears to affect its outcome in the case. This Note
attempts to provide a useful analysis of that process as it is applied by
the circuit courts. It examines the evolution of the judicial process
and the dialogue among the circuits which helped to shape its devel-
opment, paying particular attention to the courts' interpretation of
the ADA and their deference to the EEOC. In its conclusion, this
Note recommends a new framework in which courts should analyze
this issue.
7 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app. (1998). The Department ofJustice also interprets
the requirement in this way. See 28 C.F.R. § 35.104, app. A (1998).
8 See Harris, supra note 4. Professor Harris describes the application of the
EEOC interpretation:
When applied to cases of controlled impairments, the no mitigating meas-
ures guideline produces counterintuitive results. A "controlled impairment"
is one that would substantially limit a major life activity if untreated, but that
does not limit any such activity when treated with some mitigating mea-
sure .... According to the [EEOC] guideline, such individuals [with con-
trolled impairments] have disabilities even if they do not experience, and
have never experienced, any limitation from their condition.
Id. at 580.
9 See Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997); Doane v. City
of Omaha, 115 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997); Roth v. Lutheran General Hosp., 57 F.3d
1446 (7th Cir. 1995).
10 See Baert v. Euclid Beverage, Ltd., 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998); Arnold v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124
F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997).
11 See Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).
12 See Holihan v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 87 F.3d 362 (9th Cir. 1996).
13 See Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996). Graves'
disease is "an endocrine disorder affecting the thyroid gland." Id. at 518.
14 SeeWashington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (1998). Adult
Stills disease is "a degenerative rheumatoid condition affecting [the] bones and
joints." Id. at 466.
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The mitigating measures issue reached the Eleventh Circuit later
that year in Harris v. H & W Contracting Co.2 1 In Harris, the court
reversed summary judgment for the defendant, taking 'Judicial notice
that Graves' disease is a condition that is capable of substantially limit-
ing major life activities if left untreated by medication. ' 22 Citing Chev-
ron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,23 the court
stated that the EEOC's interpretation "should be given 'considerable
weight' and should not be disturbed unless it appears from the statute
or legislative history that Congress intended otherwise."24 The court
found no conflict between the EEOC's interpretation and the statu-
tory requirement that an impairment must "substantially limit a major
life activity."'2 5 Instead, the court determined that the text was either
"silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," and found sup-
port for its reading in the ADA's legislative history.2 6
In June, 1997, just six months after Harris, the Eighth Circuit ad-
dressed this issue in Doane v. City of Omaha.27 In Doane, the court
found that the plaintiff, who was blind in one eye, did qualify as dis-
abled under the ADA.28 While stressing its duty to "consider each situ-
ation on a case by case basis," the court stated that its analysis of this
case would "not include consideration of mitigating measures," even
though the only mitigation occurred subconsciously-in the plaintiff's
"brain."29 As in Roth and Holihan, the court reached this conclusion
without discussing whether deference was appropriate or whether the
EEOC's interpretation was a permissible construction of the ADA,
even though it found that the plaintiff did qualify as disabled.30
21 102 F.3d 516 (11th Cir. 1996).
22 Id at 522. Graves' disease is "an endocrine disorder affecting the thyroid
gland." Id at 517.
23 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24 Harris, 102 F.3d at 521 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-45). But seeArnold v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998) (criticizing Harris for ap-
plying full Chevron deference).
25 Id. at 520 (citing 42 U.S.C.A. § 12102 (2) (A) (West 1995)).
26 Id. at 521 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 and citing H.R. RPt. No. 101-
485(11), at 52 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334; H.R. REP. No. 101-
485(111), at 28-29 (1990) reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 451; S. REP. No. 101-116,
at 23 (1989)).
27 115 F.3d 624 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 693 (1998).
28 See id. at 627-28.
29 Id.
30 The court refused to follow the Fifth Circuit's finding (under the ADA's pre-
cursor, the Rehabilitation Act) which held that "a person is not handicapped if his
vision can be corrected to 20/200." Chandler v. City of Dallas, 2 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th
Cir. 1993).
1o64 [VOL- 74:3
MITIGATING MEASURES UNDER THE ADA
These early circuit decisions share a common theme: with very
little discussion of whether deference to the EtOC is appropriate or
whether its interpretation is permitted by the text, these decisions
agree not to consider mitigating measures. One exception to this
trend was the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Ellison v. Software Spectrum,
Inc.3 1 Although the court found it unnecessary to decide the issue, it
did criticize the EEOC's interpretation, stating that Congress could
easily have "provided for coverage... for impairments that have the
potential to substantially limit a major life activity" had that been its
intent.3 2 Along with several district court decisions, Ellison helped to
spark debate.
II. DEBATE BEGINS
When the Eighth Circuit released its decision in Doan, the Sixth
Circuit had just finished oral argument in Gilday v. Mecosta County.33
After a rehearing, the court endorsed Judge Cornelia G. Kennedy's
opinion, which held that whether the plaintiffs non-insulin-depen-
dent diabetes mellitus constitutes a disability under the ADA must be
determined with regard to his ability to control the disease with diet,
exercise, and oral medication.3 4 Judge Kennedy stated, "The EEOC's
position on mitigating measures appears not in the regulations them-
selves, but in an appendix to the regulations labeled 'Interpretive Gui-
dance on Tide I of the Americans with Disabilities Act."' 3 5 Judge
Kennedy concluded that these rules were "interpretative, rather than
legislative," and as such did not merit full Chevron deference.3 6 Quot-
ing Reno v. Koray,37 Judge Kennedy explained that the EEOC's inter-
pretation would merit "some deference" were it a "permissible
construction of the statute."3 8 The opinion also acknowledged that
31 85 F.3d 187 (5th Cir. 1996).
32 Id. at 191-92 n.3 (emphasis added).
33 124 F.3d 760 (6th Cir. 1997) (en banc).
34 See id. at 761, 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35 Id. at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing 29
C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app. (1997)).
36 Id. But see Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 902
(E.D. Pa. 1997) (stating that the EEOC "guidelines were subject to public notice and
comment procedures, similar to those which normally apply to regulations.... Thus,
the guidelines arguably have more force than would an ordinary interpretive rule.").
See also 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991); 56 Fed. Reg. 35726-28 (1991).
37 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995).
38 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Judge Kennedy appears to be applying the type of deference the Supreme
Court described in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944). For a de-
scription of Skidmore deference, see infra note 75.
1999] lO6 5
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
the "ADA's vast legislative history [does] lend some support to the
EEOC's position."3 9 Judge Kennedy continued, "Where the statutory
text is unambiguous, however, as I believe it is here, that ends the
matter.14°
This decision represented a major departure from earlier cases.
Rather than deferring without comment, the court began a dialogue
with the EEOC regarding the appropriateness of deference and the
permissibility of the EEOC interpretation. The majority of courts con-
fronting this issue after Gilday have continued the discourse.4 1
Judges Karen Nelson Moore and Ralph B. Guy wrote separately in
Gilday, discussing the appropriate level of deference and the EEOC's
construction of the statute. Stating that some deference to the EEOC
was appropriate, 4 2 Judge Moore found its construction permissible
and persuasive in light of the text, purpose, and legislative history of
the ADA.43 Judge Guy concluded that the issue "must be decided on a
case by case basis."44 On these facts, however, he agreed with Judge
Kennedy that the text "cannot bear the interpretation adopted by the
EEOC."45
Nineteen days after the Gilday decision, the Third Circuit joined
the dialogue with Matczak v. Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co.46 In
Matczak, the court reversed summary judgment for the defendant,
finding that the plaintiff's epileptic condition should be considered
without regard to his "use of medication." 47 Although the court
agreed with the Sixth Circuit that something less than full Chevron
deference was due the EEOC interpretive guidelines, it still gave the
EEOC's position "controlling weight" as an interpretation of the
39 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
40 I&
41 See Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 865 (1st Cir. 1998) (col-
lecting circuit opinions considering the EEOC's interpretation); Sutton v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) (collecting district and circuit opinions); see
also Harris, supra note 4, at 602-03 nn.92-93; Puma, supra note 4, at 126-139.
42 See Gilday, 124 F.3d at 763, n.2.
43 See id. at 763-64.
44 Id. at 768 (Guy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
45 Id. (quoting Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Quoting
Ohio Public Employees Retirement Systems v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989), Judge Guy
stated, "Of course, no deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with the
plain language of the statute itself." Id.
46 136 F.3d 933 (3d Cir. 1997).
47 Id. at 937.
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agency's own regulations.48 The court identified the ADA's legislative
history as a "second source of guidance."49 Also, the court implied
that the statutory text was ambiguous, stating that "[t]he ADA itself
does not say whether mitigating measures should be considered in
determining whether" an individual is disabled. 50 Although Matczak
reached the opposite conclusion, its reasoning, indeed its judicial pro-
cess, reveals the influence of Gilday.
The week following Matczak, the Tenth Circuit announced its de-
cision in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.51 In Sutton, the court held that
the plaintiffs' uncorrected vision did not constitute a disability be-
cause it was corrected by eyeglasses or contact lenses.52 Aligning itself
with the Sixth Circuit, the court stated that the EEOC's interpretation
"is in direct conflict with the plain language of the ADA."'53 The court
also agreed with Gilday and Matczak that something less than full Chev-
ron deference was appropriate. 54
These three late 1997 cases also share a theme. Beginning with
Gilday, though perhaps prompted by district court decisions,5 5 the cir-
cuit courts began to look at the statutory text and the interpretive
guidelines with an increasing amount of scrutiny. At the same time,
the conclusions of the courts became increasingly unpredictable, best
illustrated by the separate opinions in Gilday.
48 Id. (quoting Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) and
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945)). Citing Appalachian
States Low-Level Radioactive Waste Commission v. O'Leary, 93 F.3d 103, 112-13 (3d Cir.
1996), the court also acknowledged a lesser degree of deference due interpretive
rules. See id.
49 Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 101485(II), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.GAN. 303, 334; S. RE,. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989)).
50 Id
51 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997) cert. granted, No. 97-1943, 1999 WL 5326 (Jan. 8,
1999).
52 See id, at 903.
53 Id. at 902.
54 The court stated that "while the EEOC's Interpretive Guidance may be entitled
to some consideration in our analysis, it does not carry the force of law and is not
entitled to any special deference under Chevron." Id. at 899 n.3. As in Gilday, the
court appears to be applying Skidmore deference. For a description of Skidmore defer-
ence, see infra note 75.
55 See Sutton, 130 F.3d at 901 n.7-8 (collecting cases on both sides of the issue);
Puma, supra note 4, at 126-39 (same); see also Harris, supra note 4, at 576 n.7.
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III. NARROWING DEFERENCE
In 1998, four circuit courts considered the issue. In McGuinness
v. University of New Mexico School of Medicine5 6 and Baert v. Euclid Bever-
age, Ltd.,57 the Tenth and Seventh Circuits followed their respective
decisions in Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc.58 and Roth v. Lutheran General
Hosp.59 with little discussion of the issue. The First and Fifth Circuit
decisions in Arnold v. United Parcel Service, Inc.60 and Washington v.
HCA Health Services of Texas, Inc.61 provide a more thorough discussion
of the issue.
In Baert, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff's diabetes
must be evaluated without regard to his ability "to control the effects
of the disease with insulin."62 As in Roth, the court deferred to the
EEOC without discussing whether it was appropriate to do so or
whether the interpretation was a permissible construction of the text.
The court did, however, acknowledge the existence of differing
opinions.63
In McGuinness, an unpublished opinion, 64 the Tenth Circuit
found that the plaintiff's anxiety disorder was not a disability under
the ADA because the plaintiff could "mitigate his anxiety in chemistry
and math [classes] by altering his study habits."65 Without reference
to the EEOC position or the circuit split, the court stated that
"[u] nder the law of this circuit, we must consider the plaintiffs ability
to mitigate his impairment in determining if that impairment substan-
tially limits a major life activity."'66
In Arnold, the First Circuit held that the plaintiff's "diabetes, in its
untreated state, is a disability protected from discrimination by the
ADA."67 The court considered "the legislative history and the broad
remedial purposes of the Act," as well as its structure, in holding that
56 No. 97-2249, 1998 WL 777070 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1998).
57 149 F.3d 626 (7th Cir. 1998).
58 130 F.3d 893 (10th Cir. 1997).
59 57 F.3d 1446 (7th Cir. 1995).
60 136 F.3d 854 (1st Cir. 1998).
61 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
62 Baert, 149 F.3d at 630.
63 See id.
64 See 10th CIR. R. 36 (stating terms and conditions for citing unpublished
opinions).
65 McGuinness v. University of New Mex. Sch. of Med., No. 97-2249, 1998 WL
777070 at *4 (10th Cir. Nov. 4, 1998).
66 Id.
67 Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 866 (1st Cir. 1998).
1o68 [VOL. 74:3
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mitigating measures should not be considered. 6 The court also
found that the district court erred in "failing to afford adequate con-
sideration" to the EEOC's interpretation, 69 even though "something
less than full Chevron deference" was required.70 However, the court
explicitly limited its holding to the facts, stating that it "might reach a
different result" on facts such as those the Tenth Circuit faced in
Sutton.
7 1
In September, the Fifth Circuit addressed the issue in Washing-
ton.72 In this case, the court held that "mitigating measures should
not be taken into account when assessing" the plaintifFs Adult Stills
disease. 73 Reluctantly, the court deferred to the EEOC, expressing its
sympathy for the Gilday/Sutton line of reasoning:
We are not unsympathetic to this [line of] reasoning. In fact, we
think that these cases, which have held that mitigating measures
must be taken into account, offer the most reasonable reading of the
ADA. However, we also recognize that we cannot simply ignore the
legislative history and EEOC Guidelines that dictate the opposite
result. Only if we determine that the statute was unambiguous on
its face and the agency interpretation was contrary to the plain
meaning of the statute, can we ignore the EEOC's interpretation. 74
68 Id. at 863. But see Harris, supra note 4 (discussing the ADA's purposes as stated
in the act at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (a) (7) (1994)). Professor Harris' analysis suggests that
the purposes of the ADA are not served by a rule requiring courts to ignore mitigating
measures:
Individuals with controlled impairments do not suffer from a fundamental
difference in living historically and have not been subjected to discrimina-
tion. No social stigmas attach to controlled impairments precisely because
they are controlled. No stereotypes or misperceptions attach to controlled
impairments because they have no obvious effect on the daily activities of the
individuals. Individuals with controlled impairments do not suffer from dis-
crimination on the basis of characteristics they cannot control because they
can and do control their impairments. No evidence or objective reason sup-
ports the belief that individuals with controlled impairments are the subject
of invidious discrimination.
Id. at 595.
69 Arnol, 136 F.3d at 863.
70 Id. at 864 (quoting Commonwealth of Mass. v. F.D.I.C., 102 F.3d 615, 621 (1st
Cir. 1996)). Again, as in Gilday and Sutton, the court appears to be applying Skidmore
deference. For a description of Skidmore deference, see infra note 75.
71 Id. at 866 n.10.
72 Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464 (5th Cir. 1998).
73 Id. at 471. Adult Stills disease is "a degenerative rheumatoid condition affect-
ing [the] bones and joints." Id. at 466.
74 Id. at 469.
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The court listed several factors that determine how much deference it
must give an agency interpretation, and applying them, concluded
that "more than minimum deference" was appropriate.7 5 Much like
the First Circuit in Arnold, however, the court limited its holding to
"serious impairments and ailments that are analogous to those men-
tioned in the EEOC Guidelines and the legislative history [such as]
diabetes, epilepsy, and hearing impairments. 76
If there is a common theme in the recent cases, other than stare
decisis, it appears to be a tendency to examine the facts "on a case by
case basis," as Judge Guy advised in Gilday.77 The courts appear to be
narrowing the amount of deference they are willing to give the EEOC
interpretation. Yet they are deferring to that interpretation as they
criticize it. It remains unclear whether this trend is a temporary com-
promise or the result of a more carefully crafted judicial process, but
time-or the Supreme Court-will soon tell.
TV. ANALYsIs
Several questions remain regarding the development of the judi-
cial process by which this issue is addressed. Is the ADA definition of
"disabled" ambiguous or not? How much authority did Congress actu-
ally delegate to the EEOC? Precisely how much deference is owed to
the EEOC interpretation? Is the ADA's legislative history helpful in
determining congressional intent? And ultimately, is it really appro-
priate to ignore mitigating measures? This section attempts to answer
these questions.
75 Id. at 470. Citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944) and
Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2207 (1998) (quoting Skidmore), the court discussed
"varying degrees of deference":
The amount of deference that a court must give to agency interpretations
depends on several factors. The factors include: "the circumstances of their
promulgation, the consistency with which the agency has adhered to the po-
sition announced, the evident consideration which has gone into its formu-
lation, and the nature of the agency's expertise."
Washington, 152 F.3d at 470 (quoting Rowinsky v. Bryan Indep. Sch. Dist., 80 F.3d
1006, 1014 n.20 (5th Cir. 1996)). See also Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Sepa-
rating Interpretation and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. LJ. AM. U. 187, 208-09
(1992) (discussing the role of Skidmore deference today); Harris, supra note 4, at
602-04 (discussing deference in the context of the mitigating measures issue).
76 Washington, 152 F.3d at 470.
77 Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 768 (6th Cir. 1997) (Guy, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
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A. Applying Chevron
In Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,78
the Supreme Court created a two-step test for determining whether
deference to an agency interpretation of law is appropriate. A court
facing the mitigating measures issue should only defer to the EEOC
interpretation after conducting a Chevron analysis and determining
that deference is appropriate.
1. Ambiguous or Not?
Step one of the Chevron test requires the court to determine
whether Congress has "unambiguously expressed" its intent, or
whether it "has not directly addressed the precise question at issue. ' 79
Professor Robert A. Anthony phrases this inquiry: "Is there specific
congressional intent on the precise question at issue?"8 0 Quoting Mor-
ton v. Ruiz,8 ' he asks whether the statute requires the administering
agency "to fill any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. '8 2
Justice Antonin Scalia asks, "How clear is clear?"8 He says, "It is
here, if Chevron is not abandoned, that the future battles over accept-
ance of agency interpretations of law will be fought."8 4 Professor Cass
R. Sunstein states the test in this way: "Chevron is inapplicable when
the particular context suggests that deference would be a poor recon-
struction of congressional desires. '8 5 Former Judge Kenneth W. Starr
also describes the inquiry:
First, the court must consider whether Congress "has directly spo-
ken to the precise question at issue." This inquiry into legislative
intent should focus first on the plain language of the statute. If the
answer is not found in the statute itself, then the court should look
to the measure's legislative history. As the Court declared, "if the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the
78 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
79 Id. at 843.
80 Robert A. Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the
Courtsi, 7 YALEJ. ON REG. 1, 17 (1990).
81 415 U.S. 199 (1974), quoted in Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
82 Anthony, supra note 80, at 17.
83 Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE LJ. 511, 520-21.
84 Id.
85 Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90 COLUM. L. REv.
2071, 2091 (1990).
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court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress."
8 6
Professor Michael Herz simply asks, "[D]oes the statute provide an
answer?"1
7
Applied to mitigating measures, the question is this: is the ADA
clear or is it ambiguous regarding whether the court should consider
mitigating measures when assessing a plaintiff's alleged disability?
Professor Herz recommends a new metaphor, "the scheme of biologi-
cal classification,"88 for this analysis:
In its broadest enactments, Congress has identified the kingdom
and nothing else. Congress occasionally gets down to the species
level, but that task is generally left for agencies. Under this meta-
phor, the courts' role is to ensure that as the agency becomes more
specific it remains within the larger boundaries established by Con-
gress.... The gap-filling metaphor implies that... Congress has
said nothing, i.e., left a gap .... The biological classification meta-
phor, in contrast, implies that Congress always has said something
and reminds us that an agency cannot reach what Congress has not.
The statute may identify only the broadest outlines, but it always
limits the agency's authority to some extent. The role of the court is
to ensure that as the agency spells things out with increasing speci-
ficity it stays within the boundaries established by Congress. 89
Herz's metaphor emphasizes that Congress does not have to specify a
particular construction in order to exclude another.90
When it is applied to the issue of mitigating measures under the
ADA, Herz's metaphor suggests that, even if the statutory definition of
disability is ambiguous, it does exclude plaintiffs who are not substan-
86 Kenneth W. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALEJ. ON REG. 283,
288 (1986) (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43).
87 Herz, supra note 75, at 216. For further discussion of Chevron, see Theodore L.
Garrett, Judicial Review After Chevron: The Courts Reassert Their Role, 10 NAT. RESOURcES
& ENV'T 59 (1995); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); RichardJ. Pierce, Jr., Reconciling Chevron and Stare
Decisis, 85 GEO. L.J. 2225 (1997); Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Cases Per Year:
Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Ac-
tion, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 1093 (1987).
88 Herz, supra note 75, at 230.
89 Id. at 230-32. While this analysis may seem appropriate under step two of the
Chevron inquiry, it is also relevant here. A statute may be amenable to differing inter-
pretations and yet provide a clear answer to what Chevron calls "the precise question at
issue." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843.
90 See Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 469 (1998)
(quoting Ohio Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171 (1989))
("[N]o deference is due to agency interpretations at odds with the plain language of
the statute itself."); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 767 (1997) (same).
[VOL. 74:31072
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tially limited in a major life activity, as the text unequivocally re-
quiresP1 Thus, the requisite judicial process of the step-one inquiry
asks first, whether the statute clearly defines the judicial role in con-
sidering the use and availability of mitigating measures, and second,
whether the statute clearly excludes ignoring mitigating measures in
making the disability determination.
While the answer to the former is probably "no," the answer to
the latter is "yes." Congress' use of broad, undefined terms such as
"substantially limits" implies that it intended to delegate to the agen-
cies a role in developing the definitions of key statutory terms. But
however disability is defined, Congress dearly intended to exclude
from ADA protection plaintiffs who are not substantially limited in a
major life activity.9 2
Of course, the EEOC interpretation is meaningless if applied only
after a plaintiff meets the "substantially limits" requirement. Such a
construction would assist only those plaintiffs who already qualify in
qualifying as disabled. It is only a plaintiff who is not substantially
limited in a major life activity, but who might be so considered under
the EEOC interpretation, that can benefit from this construction. Be-
cause they are not limited in any substantial way, the text excludes
such plaintiffs.
The Gilday court may have overstated the case in claiming that
the "statutory text is unambiguous."93 But the Sutton court correctly
addressed the issue in spite of any ambiguity, finding that "the
EEOC's Interpretive Guidance is in direct conflict with the plain lan-
guage of the ADA."94 Thus, this issue should be resolved in Chevron's
first step, negating the need for a step-two inquiry. Nonetheless,
courts continue to apply a step-two analysis.
2. How Much Deference?
The court must apply step two of the Chevron test if it finds in step
one that the statute does not answer "the precise question at issue."95
Step two requires that the court defer to an agency interpretation if it
91 See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994).
92 See id.
93 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 767 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Cf Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859 (1st Cir. 1998) ("The statu-
tory language, on its face, gives no clue as to which interpretation Congress
intended.").
94 Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 902 (10th Cir. 1997).
95 Chevron, U.S.A, Inc., v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843 (1984).
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is "based on a permissible construction of the statute." 96 Professor
Anthony states this inquiry in two parts: "[I] s there express delegation
of authority to elucidate by regulation? If not, is there implicit delega-
tion of some sort of authority to fill the gap?"9 7
The Court stated in Chevron, "If there is an express delegation of
authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute
by regulation," it is given controlling weight unless "arbitrary, capri-
cious or manifestly contrary to the statute."98 Where the delegation is
implicit, deference is appropriate providing the agency's interpreta-
tion is reasonable. 99 However, where there is no delegation of law-
making authority, or where the issue in question is beyond the scope
of any delegation, the court is not bound by the agency's interpreta-
tion. Rather, in Professor Anthony's words, it should extend "to the
agency's view such special consideration as it finds helpful."100
Professor Anthony also states that Chevron deference is inappro-
priate for interpretations "expressed only in an informal format-
such as in interpretive rules and policy statements."'u 0 Professor Herz
agrees that interpretive rules lack Chevron credentials, stating that
"agency views of congressional meaning" merit only Skidmore defer-
ence. 10 2 An agency opinion in such a format is "not ordinarily ... a
tool [by which] Congress intends to implement its delegation of law-
making authority.' 10 3
96 Id.
97 Anthony, supra note 80, at 17 (numbering omitted). Phrasing the step-two
inquiry in terms of delegation rather than reasonableness is preferable to avoid what
Professor Ronald M. Levin describes as "intemal incoherence":
Under the structure of the Chevron formula, a court should not reach step
two unless it has already found during step one that the statute supports the
govemment's interpretation or at least is ambiguous with respect to it. In
other words, the agency's view is not clearly contrary to the meaning of the
statute. If the court has made such a finding, one would think that the gov-
ernment's interpretation must be at least "reasonable" in the court's eyes.
Why, then, is the second step not superfluous? Obviously, if it is to be mean-
ingful, the step two inquiry has to involve qualitatively different considera-
tions from those implicated during step one.
Levin, supra note 87, at 1261.
98 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
99 See id.
100 Anthony, supra note 80, at 40-41 (referring to Skidmore deference).
101 Id. at 43.
102 Herz, supra note 75, at 215.
103 Anthony, supra note 80, at 46. Professor Anthony describes this rationale as
follows:
[A] practice of routine acceptance for interpretations expressed in [infor-
mal] formats would, in abdication ofjudicial duties under Marbury, endow
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Whether Congress has delegated authority to an agency is signifi-
cant because separation of powers doctrine requires the courts to rec-
ognize the will of Congress. The judicial branch, however, reserves
the power to say what the law is.104 Thus, it is the court that deter-
mines whether there has been a delegation, but an agency interpreta-
tion controls where it is within the scope of such delegation. Chevron
presumes that an unreasonable interpretation falls outside the permis-
sible scope of any implicitly delegated authority. Where the delega-
tion is explicit, Chevron presumes that the authority is exceeded only
when the agency position is "arbitrary, capricious or manifestly con-
trary to the statute." 10 5
In considering the issue of mitigating measures under the ADA,
recent circuit decisions have recognized that something less than full
Chevron deference to the EEOC is appropriate. 10 6 Most apply a de-
gree of deference similar to that required by Skidmore.107 Because the
EEOC's interpretation is expressed informally in an appendix to its
rules, this lesser degree of deference is appropriate. 10 8 Furthermore,
it is unclear whether the scope of Congress' delegation of law-making
authority to the EEOC reaches this issue. 10 9 Thus, Chevron's second
them with force of law where Congress did not intend them to have such
force. By this process, the agency would bind the public without itself being
bound by interpretations in these formats. And since these formats are ex-
empt from APA public participation requirements, an especially odious frus-
tration is visited upon the affected private parties: they are bound by a
proposition they had no opportunity to help shape and will have no mean-
ingful opportunity to challenge when it is applied to them.
I& at 57-58.
104 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the prov-
ince and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
105 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
106 See Washington v. HCA Health Servs. of Tex., Inc., 152 F.3d 464, 470 (1998);
Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 864 (1998); Sutton v. United Air-
lines, Inc., 130 F.3d 893, 899 n.3 (1997); Gilday v. Mecosta County, 124 F.3d 760, 763
n.2 (6th Cir. 1997); id at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107 See supra note 106 (collecting cases discussing deference).
108 See Washington, 152 F.3d at 469-70; Arnold 136 F.3d at 864; Sutton, 130 F.3d at
899 n.3; Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). But see Wilson v. Pennsylvania State Police Dep't, 964 F. Supp. 898, 902 (E.D.
Pa. 1997) (citing 56 Fed. Reg. 8578 (1991) and 56 Fed. Reg. 35,726 (1991)).
109 See supra text accompanying note 100; see also Burgdorf, supra note 4, at 463
(citing 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 12116-17 (West Supp. 1990)). Professor Robert L. Burgdorf
describes Congress' delegation:
The [EEOC] is directed to promulgate regulations for carrying out title I [of
the ADA] .... The EEOC, the Attorney General and the Office of Federal
Contract Compliance Programs are directed to develop and is-
sue ... regulations containing "coordinating mechanisms" to avoid duplica-
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step confirms that courts are not bound by the EEOC's position on
mitigating measures.
It remains unclear, however, precisely how much deference is re-
quired under Skidmore. The circuit courts speak of "some defer-
ence,""u 0 "some consideration,"' 1 "some weight onjudicial review,"" 12
or "something less than full Chevron deference.""u 3 The Fifth Circuit
conducts a factor analysis to determine the appropriate amount of
deference."14 Coupled with a supportive legislative history,"15 this
lesser degree of deference may be sufficient to persuade many courts
to refuse to consider mitigating measures. Nonetheless, "a reviewing
court must conduct an independent evaluation" of the issue rather
than simply deferring to the agency's construction. 16
B. Interpreting Legislative History
In conducting an independent evaluation, many courts have
sought guidance in the legislative history of the ADA.1' 7 A House
Committee on Education and Labor Report (House Labor Report)
addresses the issue:
Whether a person has a disability should be assessed without regard
to the availability of mitigating measures, such as reasonable accom-
modations or auxiliary aids. For example, a person who is hard of
hearing is substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing,
even though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing
aid. Likewise, persons with impairments, such as epilepsy or diabe-
tes, which substantially limit a major life activity are covered under
tion and inconsistency with the requirements and enforcement of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117(b)). Professor Harris states that Congress "vested in
the EEOC the authority and responsibility to promulgate regulations interpreting the
Act." Harris, supra note 4, at 578.
110 Washington, 152 F.3d at 470; Gilday, 124 F.3d at 766 (Kennedy,J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Reno v. Koray, 515 U.S. 50, 61 (1995)).
111 Sutton, 130 F.3d at 899 n.3.
112 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 763 n.2 (quoting KENNETH Cul" DAVIS & RPcHARDJ. PIERCE,
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 6.3 at 242-43 (3d ed. 1994)). The court stated that such
"agency interpretation should be given effect if persuasive." Id.
113 Arnold, 136 F.3d at 864 (quoting Commonwealth of Mass. v. F.D.I.C., 102 F.3d
615, 621 (1st Cir. 1996)).
114 See Washington, 152 F.3d at 470.
115 See infra notes 118-19.
116 Gilday, 124 F.3d at 763 n.2.
117 See Washington, 152 F.3d at 467-68; Arnold, 136 F.3d at 859-60; Matczak v.
Frankford Candy & Chocolate Co., 136 F.3d 933, 937 (3rd Cir. 1997); Gilday, 124 F.3d
at 764-65; Harris v. H & W Contracting Co., 102 F.3d 516, 521 (11th Cir. 1996).
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the first prong of the definition of disability, even if the effects of
the impairment are controlled by medication.1 1 8
A House Judiciary Committee Report and a Senate Report also ad-
dress the issue in nearly identical language." 9
In Arnold, the court examined the House and Senate Reports in
light of the structure of the ADA and its broad remedial purpose:
Both the explicit language and the illustrative examples included in
the ADA's legislative history make it abundantly clear that Congress
intended the analysis of an "impairment" and of the question
whether it "substantially limits a major life activity" to be made on
the basis of the underlying (physical or mental) condition, without
considering the ameliorative effects of medication, prostheses, or
other mitigating measures.12 0
In Washington, however, the court acknowledged that the Senate Re-
port is "to some extent inconsistent with the House Reports in its
treatment of individuals with controlled disabilities."' 21 The Report
includes language similar to that quoted above, stating that courts
should not consider mitigating measures. But it goes on to describe
one purpose of the third prong of the ADA. According to the Report,
the third prong, which protects individuals from "being regarded as"
disabled, 122 ensures "that persons with medical conditions that are
under control, and that therefore do not currently limit major life
activities, are not discriminated against on the basis of their medical
conditions."' 2 3 This section of the report lists as examples "individu-
als with controlled diabetes or epilepsy."'124
If controlled diabetes and epilepsy "do not.., limit major life
activities,"125 as the Report suggests, then neither do they qualify as
disabilities. In Washington, the court ultimately dismissed this argu-
ment, finding that the Senate Report merited less weight than the
118 H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.CA.N. 303,
334.
119 See H.R. REP. No. 101-485(111), at 28-29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 451 ("The impairment should be assessed without considering whether mitigat-
ing measures, such as auxiliary aids or reasonable accommodations, would result in a
less-than-substantial limitation."); S. REP. No. 101-116, at 23 (1989) ([W]hether a per-
son has a disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of mitigating
measures such as reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids.").
120 Arnold, 136 F.3d at 859.
121 Washington., 152 F.3d at 468.
122 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (C).
123 S. REP. No. 101-116, at 24 (1989).
124 Id-
125 Id
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House Reports. 12 6 In Arnold, the court also briefly addressed and dis-
missed this argument, finding that "the Senate Report is not actually
inconsistent with that report's prior language (identical with that of
the House Report) stating that courts should focus on the untreated
impairments." 127 The court concluded that Congress' intent on the
issue is "abundantly clear."'128
Two additional inconsistencies exist within the House Labor Re-
port. First, the Report clearly states that an impairment is not a disa-
bility "for the purposes of the ADA unless its severity is such that it
results in a 'substantial limitation of one or more major life activi-
ties."1 2 9 Whether an impairment is severe is closely related to the
availability and use of mitigating measures. For example, cancer and
AIDS are severe because of their life-threatening effects, but also be-
cause they are difficult to treat and often impossible to cure. Likewise,
dehydration is not severe if it is readily treated by drinking and retain-
ing liquids. It becomes serious, however, when one of these mitigat-
ing measures is unavailable. Thus, as far as the Report asks courts to
determine whether an impairment is severe without considering miti-
gating measures, it is inconsistent.
Second, the Report clearly states that "[w]hether a person has a
disability should be assessed without regard to the availability of miti-
gating measures."' 3 0 The Report is not as clear regarding whether
courts should consider the use of mitigating measures. An approach
which considers use, but not availability, would be consistent with a
"case by case," factual inquiry such as the EEOC interpretation re-
quires.' 3 ' Considering impairments in a hypothetical, unmitigated
state, however, does not seem consistent with that requirement. The
subsequent sentence in the Report states that "a person who is hard of
hearing is substantially limited in the major life activity of hearing,
even though the loss may be corrected through the use of a hearing
aid.' 3 2 The language, "may be corrected," could be construed to in-
clude only availability and not actual use. However, the next sentence
contradicts such an interpretation, stating that "impairments, such as
epilepsy or diabetes ... are covered under the first prong of the defi-
126 See Washington, 152 F.3d at 468.
127 Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 860 (1st Cir. 1998).
128 Id at 859.
129 H.R. REP. No. 101-485(11), at52 (1990), reprinted in1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(emphasis added).
130 Id. (emphasis added).
131 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(j), app. (1997).
132 H.R. REP. No. 101-485(II), at 52 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 334
(emphasis added).
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nition of disability, even if the effects of the impairment are controlled
by medication.' 33 The court, then, is left with inconsistent obliga-
tions-to conduct a case by case, factual inquiry into an impairment,
and to do so considering the impairment in its hypothetical, unmiti-
gated state.
These inconsistencies in the ADA's legislative history render it
less helpful than it at first appears. Although certain sections of the
history bolster the EEOC interpretation, other sections implicitly con-
tradict it. The EEOC may have the stronger argument, but the First
Circuit overstated the case in finding the legislative history "abun-
dantly clear '134 on this issue.
V. CONCLUSION
The courts addressing the mitigating measures issue have dis-
cussed the issue in terms of ambiguity and reasonableness. A more
academic, and accurate, framework might phrase the inquiry in differ-
ent terms-perhaps statutory meaning and delegation of law-making
authority would be more precise. Such a framework follows.
When confronted with the mitigating measures issue, courts must
perform a Chevron analysis. Step one of this process inquires first,
whether the statute clearly defines the judicial role in considering the
use and availability of mitigating measures. It does not. Step one also
inquires, more specifically, whether the meaning of the statute clearly
excludes ignoring mitigating measures in making the disability deter-
mination. It does. Because ignoring mitigating measures would grant
ADA protection to plaintiffs the statute plainly excludes-plaintiffs
who face no substantial limitation-the statute does answer this ques-
tion. Because the statute resolves the issue, the inquiry should end
here.
Even if a court decides the statute does not provide an answer,
step two of the Chevron analysis allows it to consider mitigating meas-
ures. Step two inquires first, whether Congress has explicitly dele-
gated law-making authority to the EEOC, and second, whether it has
done so implicitly. Because the EEOC's interpretation is expressed
informally, it falls outside the scope of any delegated authority. Thus,
Chevron's second step confirms that courts are not bound by the
EEOC's position but must grant it "some deference"-a degree of def-
erence which is not clearly defined.
A court may also look to the ADA's legislative history for gui-
dance. Although sections of the history support the EEOC's position,
133 Id. (emphasis added).
134 Arnold v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 136 F.3d 854, 859 (1998).
1999] 1079
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
other sections are implicitly inconsistent, both internally and exter-
nally. This inconsistency greatly limits its value as an interpretive tool.
While we may have to wait for a Supreme Court decision to settle
the issue,' 35 the evolution of the judicial process this issue warrants is
nearly complete. The dialogue among the circuits, starting with
Gilday, has contributed significantly to the development of this pro-
cess. Recent scholarship may contribute similarly.13 6 Although some
debate remains regarding the degree of deference the EEOC's inter-
pretation merits and the value of the ADA's legislative history, the de-
cisions since Gilday are nearly unanimous regarding the framework of
the Chevron analysis. With this framework intact, we can expect more
consistent and predictable results as courts face the mitigating meas-
ures issue in the future.
Jonathan Bridges*
135 This wait may be brief since the Court recently granted certiorari in Sutton v.
United Airlines, Inc., No. 97-1943, 1999 WL 5326 (Jan. 8, 1999).
136 See supra note 4.
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